A central tenet of constructivist models of conceptual development is that children's initial conceptual level constrains how they make sense of new evidence and thus whether exposure to evidence will prompt conceptual change. Yet, little experimental evidence directly examines this claim for the case of sustained, fundamental conceptual achievements. The present study combined scaling and experimental microgenetic methods to examine the processes underlying conceptual change in the context of an important conceptual achievement of early childhoodthe development of a representational theory of mind. Results from 47 children (M age = 3.7 years) indicate that only children who were conceptually close to understanding false belief at the beginning of the study, and who were experimentally exposed to evidence of people acting on false beliefs, reliably developed representational theories of minds. Combined scaling and microgenetic data revealed how prior conceptual level interacts with experience, thereby providing critical experimental evidence for how conceptual change results from the interplay between conceptions and evidence.
Baillargeon, Song, & Leslie, 2010; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Song, Onishi, Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2008; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007) , the development of an explicit representational theory of mind in preschool remains an important conceptual achievement. Indeed the gap between infants' implicit understanding of FB and the later development of explicit FB concepts makes the development of theory of mind a particularly intriguing developmental puzzle and highlights the importance of understanding the processes that underlie conceptual development in this domain.
Third, preschool theory of mind developments, as indexed by FB developments, qualitatively change how children interact with their environment-much like the paradigm Conceptual Change 6 changes discussed above. The central importance of the development of explicit FB concepts in early childhood is underscored by its real-world implications; the ability to pass explicit FB tasks in preschool is correlated with children's popularity with peers (Peterson & Siegal, 2002; Slaughter, Dennis & Pritchard, 2002) , teacher-rated social competence (Astington, 2003; Peterson, Slaughter & Paynter, 2007; Watson, Nixon, Wilson & Capage, 1999) and skilled interactions with peers (Dunn, Cutting & Demetriou, 2000) including abilities to play games like hide-and seek (Peskin & Ardino, 1999) and social pretend play (Astington & Jenkins, 1995) .
Fourth, the preschool change from consistently incorrect FB judgments to consistently correct ones takes a year or more to accomplish in typically-developing children (Wellman et al., 2001 ). It thus constitutes not only an important change, but also a developmentally difficult one that generally requires sustained conceptual development.
Finally, and most importantly here, the series of conceptual insights that precede the development of FB understanding can be measured via a theory of mind scale (Wellman & Liu, 2004) . This scale assesses understanding of (1) Diverse Desires (people can have different desires), (2) Diverse Beliefs (people can have different beliefs), (3) Knowledge-Access (a person will not have knowledge if they have not had access to the relevant information), (4) FB (someone can believe something that is false), and (5) Hidden Emotion (someone can feel one way but display a different emotion). In cross-sectional studies, typically developing children reliably proceed in order through this series of understandings (Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005; Wellman & Liu, 2004) and change from one step to the next requires 3 to 6 months to achieve.
In the present study, we experimentally examine the role of these preliminary insights in the process of conceptual change to a representational theory of mind.
Conceptual Change 7
Although the transition from reliably incorrect to reliably correct FB performance generally takes approximately one year, prior research has developed several interventions that facilitate and speed up the development of FB understanding in preschool-age children (Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003) . Crucially, however, these intervention studies also reveal substantial individual variation in improvement-some children reliably passed FB at post-test, some showed moderate improvement, and some continued to fail.
For example, Lohmann and Tomasello (2003) compared several training conditions with young preschoolers, all of whom failed false belief at pretest. In the most successful condition, average performance on three FB tasks substantially improved after training, however, even at post-test, individual children's scores ranged from 0 to 3 (similar variation was reported by Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006) . Why do some children develop an understanding of FB following such interventions while others, exposed to the same evidence, do not? This question is fundamental to any theoretical account of the nature of cognitive change.
The possibility that we examine is that children's learning in such interventions is constrained by their previous level of conceptual understanding. That is, that children who are conceptually closer to developing an understanding of FB (i.e., as indicated by their position along the theory of mind scale) will have the prior knowledge that will enable them to make sense of the new evidence presented to them during the study, and thus that this new evidence will prompt conceptual change for these children. In contrast, children who are initially farther away from developing an understanding of FB will not have the requisite prior knowledge to make sense of the new evidence. In this way, we test whether prior knowledge both constrains and enables children's ability to learn from new evidence, in the context of a fundamental, sustained conceptual achievement of early childhood. To test these hypotheses, we recruited a Conceptual Change 8 group of children who had not yet developed an understanding of FB, but who varied from one another on the extent to which they had developed prior conceptual understandings. Using the theory of mind scale as our context, we predicted that those who already understood Knowledge Access-the level that reliably precedes FB understanding in scaling research-would develop an understanding of FB over the course of an extended training period, whereas those who had not yet developed an understanding of Knowledge Access-but were exposed to the same training sessions-would not. These predictions and the present research help address the fundamental theoretical question of how to characterize cognitive change; in our case, change to a representational theory of mind.
Our methods combined scaling methods with a microgenetic training study.
Microgenetic methods rest on fine-grained analyses of cognitive change over multiple successive sessions to provide a rich picture of development and learning as it unfolds (Siegler, 2006; Siegler & Crowley, 1992) . Although microgenetic methods have most often been used to examine skill or strategy acquisition (e.g., Luwel, Siegler, Verschaffel, 2008; Siegler & Chen, 1998; Siegler & Stern, 1998; Siegler & Svetina, 2006) , they can also be fruitfully applied to conceptual development (e.g., Opfer & Siegler, 2004 , 2007 . Our microgenetic methods were inspired by Amsterlaw and Wellman (2006) , but critically, we combined this approach with an assessment of children's initial position along the progression of conceptual insights captured by the theory of mind scale. We included sufficient children to model variation in children's progress and attainment of FB understanding. Our microgenetic method differs from a focused training study (e.g. Lohman & Tomasello 2003) , in that children receive no explicit teaching about FB concepts. Instead, children see people acting in accordance with FBs (evidence that is Conceptual Change 9 inconsistent with a non-representational theory of mind), and we assess whether and how this evidence prompts the development of a representational theory of mind.
Methods

Participants
Participants included 47 children, assigned to Experimental (n = 29, 15 male, M age = 3.77 years) or Control (n = 18, 8 male, M age = 3.76 years) conditions, recruited from private preschools in a midsize city in the mid-western United States. The larger sample in the Experimental condition reflects our primary aim of testing whether children's initial understanding of Knowledge Access (KA) predicted their development of an understanding of FB given microgenetic experiences. Our Control condition (described below) also included children who both did and did not already understand KA, in order to confirm that initial understanding of KA did not lead to an understanding of FB during the course of the experiment simply due to the passage of time (instead of due to the evidence received during the microgenetic sessions). Thus, previous understanding of KA should predict whether children develop an understanding of FB in the Experimental condition, but not in the Control condition.
Pretest and Post-test measures
To establish that children did not yet have an understanding of FB and to identify their initial conceptual level, all children completed a pretest battery and then completed the same battery at post-test (approximately 8 weeks later). These measures included the five tasks of the theory of mind scale developed by Wellman and Liu (2004; outlined earlier) . The scale includes a Contents FB task (children predict whether an agent will think that a box contains its true contents or the contents suggested by its appearance). Children also completed two additional FB tasks: a FB-self task (children report what they previously thought a crayon box containedConceptual Change 10 crayons or a toy-before they looked inside and found a toy) and a FB-location task (children predict where a character will search for an object-where he left it or in a new location-after the object was moved while the character was not looking). Children were excluded from the final sample if they passed more than one of the three FB tasks (or if they passed one FB task and one of three other related tasks; see the online supplementary materials); 96 children completed pretest measures, 49 were excluded because they (a) passed more than one FB task at pretest, (b) had no consent for participation beyond pre-testing, or (c) left their preschool prior to study completion.
Microgenetic Sessions
Children in the Experimental condition (n = 29) completed six weeks of microgenetic sessions between the pretest and post-test, with two sessions per week. Children in the Control condition had no microgenetic sessions; they completed only the pre-test and post-test measures at the same time interval as children in the Experimental condition. In each session, children completed two FB tasks, which varied in form (FB-contents or FB-locations) and presentation (shown in storybooks or acted out with props). Each task presented new characters and scenarios, but all followed the same structure. First, children were asked to predict the thoughts or behavior of an agent who had a FB, as in a standard FB task. Following the child's prediction, however, children were shown the outcome, in which the agent acted based on his or her FB. For example, children predicted whether an agent who had not seen inside a playdoh can would say there was playdoh inside (an action based on a FB) or a bouncy ball inside (an action based on reality).
After the child's prediction (children who do not yet understand FB predict that the agent will say there is a ball), the experimenter described the outcome (e.g., "Sammy says there is playdoh inside!"). Thus, across the 12 sessions, children were exposed to 24 scenarios where agents acted Conceptual Change 11 based on FBs. As all children began the experiment without an understanding of FB, they received 24 pieces of evidence that were inconsistent with their initial theories. For analyses, children received a "1" each time they predicted an action based on a FB and a "0" each time they predicted an action based on reality.
To help children focus on the discrepancies between their initial theories and the agents' actions, children were also asked to explain the agents' behaviors (a sample script is available in the online supplementary materials); 17 children were asked for explanations on every trial and 12 were asked every four trials. There were no differences based on this factor at pretest or posttest for scale-level or percentages of passed FB trials (ps > .15). Thus, all children were considered as a single experimental group (n = 29). Two independent raters coded children's explanations (see Table 1 ). Inter-rater agreement was excellent (92%).
True Belief. Every second microgenetic session, children answered one story involving true beliefs, to help them resist any expectation that all tasks had some sort of "trick" and to track whether increases in false belief accuracy occurred at the expense of general accuracy (which could result in true belief decrements). For example, children saw a juice carton, which contained juice, and were asked to predict what a character would think was inside. There was 96% accuracy on True Belief trials.
Results
Post-test FB Understanding
Our key prediction was that children whose initial conceptual level placed them closer to FB understanding would be more likely to develop an understanding of FB following exposure to relevant evidence. Thus, children who passed KA at pretest (the conceptual level immediately preceding FB) and were in the experimental group (and thus exposed to relevant evidence) Conceptual Change 12 should be most likely to develop FB understanding. We conducted a binomial regression predicting the number of FB trials passed at post-test, with age as a continuous predictor and condition (experimental, control) and pretest-KA as categorical predictors. As predicted, within the experimental condition, children who passed pretest-KA passed more FB trials at post-test than children who failed pretest-KA, p < .001, whereas within the control condition, children who passed and failed pretest-KA did not differ from each other (Figure 1) . The Condition * KA interaction was reliable, Wald χ 2 (1) = 6.98, p = .008, as was the overall model, Likelihood Ratio 
Discussion
Children's initial conceptual level determined whether and how new evidence provoked conceptual change. Specifically, understanding KA (or not) substantially predicted whether microgenetic exposure to relevant evidence provoked transition to an understanding of FB.
Initial conceptual level and the passage of time alone did not provoke this change, as control children who initially understood KA did not develop an understanding of FB. Exposure to evidence alone was also not sufficient, as experimental children who did not initially understand KA also did not develop an understanding of FB. Age was associated with improved understanding of FB, but conceptual change was predicted by the interaction between initial understanding of KA and experimental exposure to relevant evidence, controlling for age.
Conceptual Change 15
These data go beyond other studies that have examined the influence of children's prior beliefs on conceptual learning, by examining learning processes as they unfold over time (12 sessions over six weeks, as opposed to within a single experimental session). Also, we examined conceptual development with respect to a fundamental conceptual change that prior research has established as an extended and difficult developmental accomplishment; namely, preschool transition to a representational theory of mind. Moreover, we tracked not only children's increased accuracy on false belief alone, but their progression along a reliable sequence of preschool theory of mind understandings.
The present data are consistent with the proposal that the development of ToM involves a series of domain-specific conceptual changes. Although these findings do not preclude the possibility that factors external to a conceptual domain-such as children's general processing skills, engagement, inhibitory control, or memory-importantly contribute to conceptual change, the present data suggest that these abilities do not fully account for theory of mind development for several reasons. First, if the Experimental condition supported the development of FB understanding by facilitating these general abilities, it is unclear why it would do so only for children who had previously developed an understanding of KA. Yet, children's initial conceptual understanding demonstratively enabled and constrained their potential to learn from new evidence. That is, given the same extended microgenetic experiences, children's prior understandings both enabled learning (for children closer to FB on the theory of mind scale at pretest) and constrained it (for those further away to begin with). Second, we found that our measure of verbal fluency did not predict whether children in the Experimental condition developed an understanding of FB. In future work, it would be useful to include more extensive Table 1 Coding Categories for Children's Explanations
Explanation Examples
Belief "He doesn't know there is a ball in there" "He thinks there is playdoh in there, but there isn't." Mistake "He made a mistake." Desire "He wants playdoh." "He loves to play with playdoh." Situational "There's no playdoh there." "It moved away." Don't know (or no response) "I don't know" Conceptual Change 24 Figure 2. The average cumulative numbers of correct FB judgments plotted session-by-session across the microgenetic sessions, by whether children passed the knowledge access task at pretest, for children in the Experimental condition. The number plotted at session 1 shows the correct FB judgments in session 1, the plot for session 6 shows total correct FB summed across sessions 1 through 6, and so on.
